The article argues that the US is repeating historical mistakes by rejecting potential peace deals for Ukraine, driven by an unattainable desire for 'total victory.' It suggests that proposals, even if imperfect, offer Ukraine significant strategic gains and security, and continuing the war indefinitely risks leaving Ukraine worse off. The author contends that Ukraine has already achieved a 'win worth taking' and misplaced moralism should not jeopardize these accomplishments.
The author criticizes Washington's 'horrified reaction' to recent peace proposals for Ukraine, despite acknowledging that an 'unjust peace' is difficult to accept. The core argument is that the US suffers from a 'chronic inability to see the outcomes of its wars for what they are,' consistently refusing to 'take the win' or accept less than absolute victory. An example cited is the Trump administration's 28-point plan, denounced as 'capitulation,' which the author claims actually offered Kyiv a 'remarkable strategic outcome,' including a strong military and substantial security guarantees, despite territorial concessions. The article posits that continuing the war indefinitely is likely to leave Ukraine 'smaller, weaker and even more devastated.' Drawing parallels to past US conflicts, the author highlights failures in Vietnam (prolonging war to avoid 'taking the loss'), Afghanistan (unwillingness to compromise leading to unconditional withdrawal), and Iraq (failing to accept the 1991 'win' and pursuing regime change, leading to disastrous consequences). For Ukraine, the author states the situation is a 'mixed verdict' of astonishing successes and immense losses. A total battlefield victory is deemed 'fantastical,' and a compromise settlement, even if it feels like a 'dirty deal,' is 'worth making' if there's no better alternative. The article emphasizes Ukraine's significant achievements: it still stands, most of its territory is intact, and Russia has suffered enormous casualties for modest gains. This, combined with a rebuilt military, offers a strong chance to deter future wars—a 'win worth taking.' The author dismisses total security through NATO membership as unrealistic and argues that 'misplaced moralism' should not risk what has already been accomplished.
