Europe faces the stark reality of defending itself with significantly reduced or no US support, necessitating a decade of increased military spending and a new, agile leadership structure. Existing alliances like NATO and the EU are proving inadequate, pushing a 'coalition of the willing' to emerge as a potential independent European defence union.
After a year of Donald Trump’s potential second term and two Munich Security Conferences, it's clear Europe must prepare to defend itself with much less, or potentially no, US support. European leaders acknowledge the need to reduce overdependence on the US, yet many still hope for American intervention in case of a Russian attack on NATO territory, a hope that seems increasingly unrealistic given Trump's past rhetoric and preference for limited displays of power over open-ended conflicts. All European governments now recognize the need to take responsibility for their own defence, which will require a decade of substantially increased military spending. While public opinion broadly supports this, several key European states like the UK, France, and Italy are in fragile fiscal positions, unable to finance a defence surge without massive joint borrowing, a concept Germany currently opposes. Building a credible, independent European defence goes beyond buying more weapons; it demands investment in less glamorous but crucial areas like ammunition, spare parts, logistics, training, and a significant increase in armed forces, potentially involving selective conscription. Equally important is a new leadership structure for timely decision-making. The article highlights that neither NATO nor the EU can be relied upon for swift and adequate responses. NATO is US-dominated and can't act against Washington's wishes, as demonstrated by its initial reluctance to directly support Kyiv. The EU, while effective in financial sanctions, is not a defence organization and is hampered by the unanimity principle and 'awkward members' like pro-Russian Hungary and Slovakia, as well as not including crucial defence partners like the UK, Norway, and Turkey. Despite the EU's mutual defence pact (Article 42.7) being theoretically more binding than NATO's Article 5, the EU lacks military expertise and operational command. A promising alternative has emerged in the form of a 'coalition of the willing,' primarily led by France and the UK, which includes roughly 35 nations and all major European military powers. This grouping, with a nascent operational headquarters in Paris, brings together key countries and organizations without the obstructive members of the EU or NATO. An inner core of the E3 (France, Germany, UK), expanding to the E6 (adding Italy, Spain, Poland), drives influence. While currently lacking legal status or formal structure, this 'coalition of the willing' could grow into the nucleus of a future European defence union. It could operate through NATO structures when possible, but under its own command if necessary. Reviving the 1955 Western European Union treaty is suggested as a way to provide a legal basis for such a union, incorporating willing EU countries, the UK, and Norway. This 'de facto European security council' is presented as the best option for Europe to develop the nimble decision-making body needed to defend itself with significantly less US assistance.
